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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DERIVATIVE OF SOVEREIGNTY
AT INTERNATIONAL LAW
FREDERIC A. JOHNSON

I.

INTRODUCTION

THE purpose of this study is to prove from the direct statements
in the authoritative texts that the commerce power of the United
States is an embodiment of the International Law right of navigation;
that the power to regulate all aspects of this right was exclusively
vested by the Constitution in Congress together with the power to
establish a navy;1 that the immediate object of this combination of
powers was to enable the United States to force Great Britain to
grant commercial concessions by alleviating the rigidity of her existing Navigation Acts in favor of the United States; that these Acts
were the mercantilist equivalents for a protective tariff or an imperial
preference system; and that the desired alleviation by Great Britain
in their enforcement was occasioned, as Alexander Hamilton had
foreseen,2 by the conspicuous naval strength displayed by the United
States during the War of 1812; that this alleviation was inaugurated
by the commercial treaty with Great Britain of July 3, 1815;3 that it
was the construction of the mutual obligations imposed by this treaty
in the case of Elkison v. Deliessen,4 decided by Mr. Justice William
Johnson on Circuit in 1823, to forbid South Carolina upon principles
of national supremacy and of International Law to arrest a free Negro
seaman on a British vessel in Charleston Harbor, which underlies

and explains the concurring opinion of this Justice in Gibbons v.
Ogden;' and that Chief Justice Marshall," Mr. Justice Story and Mr.
Justice Washington8 were in full agreement with him on the point
Faamac A. JoHNsoN is a Member of the New York Bar.
1 U. S. Const. art. I. § 8: "The Congress shall have power . . . (3) To regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian
Tribes; . . . (11) To provide and maintain a navy; . . ."
2 THE FEDERALIST, No. 11 (J. C. Hamilton, Ed. 1888).
3 1 MALLOY, TREnAris, CONvENTiONS, INTERNATiONAL AcTs, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEmm BETWEEN Tn UnrD STATES Am ORnER PowERs 1776-1909, 624 (Wash., D. C.,
1910). See, also, MooRE, A.uERcA.r DIPZOwAcy 118 (New York & London, 1905).
4 8 Fed. Cas. 493, No. 4,366 (C. C. D. So. Car. 1823).
5 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222-239, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
6 Id. at 211.
7 The Nymph, 18 Fed. Cas. 560, No. 10,388 (C. C. D. Me. 1834).
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that the right of navigation represented a doctrine of International
Law.
Further, this study will indicate that the opinion delivered for
the Court by the Chief Justice in Gibson v. Ogden9 was probably
designed to create an unqualified precedent for the exercise by Congress of affirmative legislative power under the commerce grant; 10
whereas McCulloch v. Maryland" was merely qualified in this respect;'" and that it was this excursion into the contemporary political arena 3 which misled later generations into mistaking navigation
or transportation across state lines as of the essence of federal commerce instead of appreciating the correct principle that intrastate
regulations affecting trade or business beyond the boundaries of the
particular local sovereign were the primary requisites for interstate
commerce.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that Black Bird Creek Marsh
Company v. Willson, 4 decided in 1829, was virtually a contemporary
interpretation of Gibbons v. Ogden."0 It revealed the circumstance
that the mere passage of a coasting vessel across state lines did not
bring it perforce either within the protection of the Commerce power
or of the Congressional statute providing for coasting licenses. As a
corollary the State enactment authorizing the construction of a dam
in shallow waters did not affect commerce among the several States
in any economic or business sense. It would therefore seem that the
crossing of State boundaries in the absence of other elements is not
interstate commerce. 16
Two years earlier, Chief justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland 7 had unified national power over commerce in respect to foreign
nations through sustaining the constitutionality of a protective tariff.
The prime and universally neglected significance of this opinion
springs from the decision of Great Britain in 1830 to open the ports
8 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 547, No. 3,230 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1825).

q 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
10 Id. at 197.

11 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
12 Id. at 407.
13 "Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden removed every constitutional position
on which the Jeffersonian Republican Party stood." 1 WARREN, THE SUtPRL-m CoURT
ix UNLITED STATES HMsToRY, 77 (Boston, 1922).
14 2 Pet. 241 (U. S. 1829).

15 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
16 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35 (1867).
17 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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of the West Indies to American vessels under privileges reciprocal to
those extended prior thereto by Congress to British vessels in the
ports of the United States.
II.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD

THE respective premises to support the conclusion that the commerce power was derived from the Navigation Acts and is an outgrowth of International Law were not available until comparatively
recent years. Charles M. Andrews set forth the impact of the British
Navigation Acts and of the mercantile doctrines they embodied upon
the North American colonies or plantations during the entire era prior
to our War for Independence. 18 Lawrence T. Harper described the
substance and workings of these Acts in the seventeenth century 9
and Oliver M. Dickerson detailed the influence of the altered policy
of Great Britain after 1763 towards the enforcement of the legislation in producing the separation of the Continental Colonies from
the Mother Country. 0 From the standpoint of International Law,
Dean Alison Reppy has disclosed the relevant juristic thought which
underlies the practices during this period of the inauguration and
development of the trans-oceanic regulation of trade.2 '
The germination by Grotius of his epochal treatise on the freedom of the seas transpires during the first quarter of the seventeenth
century, the era that witnesses the founding of Virginia and Massachusetts, the introduction of the African slave trade into North
America, and the fruition from common law sources of the Statute
Against Monopolies.22 "An age of discovery and bold adventure has
28
given place to an age of commerce and organization.
The capitalistic class of southern and southwestern England at
that epoch was assuming the financial risks of overseas expansion.24
At mid-century, the Long Parliament laid the basis through the
18 4 TnE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AmICAN HISTORY (Cambridge, 1938).
19 THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS (New York, 1939).
20 NAVIGATION AcTs AND THE A.umCAx REvOLUTioN (1951).

21 The Grotian Doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas Reappraised, 19 FORDHA
L. REv. 243 (1950).
22 21 Jas. I, c. 3, 4 (1623-4); 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 353
(Boston, 1931).
23 1 WoODROW WILSON, A HISTORY oF =IE AmERICAN PEOPLE (Documentary Ed.,
New York & London, 1902).
24 ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF A.mRCAN HISTORY, 75-77 (Cambridge,
1938).
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Navigation Act of 1651 for the later Acts of regulation of the economy
2
of England and also that of her colonies or plantations. 1
Each of the organized seafaring nations of Europe was engaged
for the following two centuries in effectuating the prevalent policy
of exclusive control over trade with her own colonies. The claim of
domination over the high seas was an essential attribute for such
control. Mare Liberum owed its eventual publication by Grotius to
a brief prepared and submitted by him at twenty-one as a proctor
in Admiralty in successful support of a claim of prize on behalf of
the United East Indies Company for a seizure of a Portuguese ship
and cargo in Indian waters.2 The Dutch were then combating the
claim of Portugal to dominion over the Indian Ocean.
Pragmatic considerations, not the persuasiveness of legal writers
upon sovereign states, led ultimately in 1817 to the recognition by
Lord Stowell in Le Louiss 7 of the juristic principle evolved from Grotius "that no state could lawfully bar other states from making free
use of the high seas for navigation or fishing." 28 What the intervening works of the jurists "really meant was that sovereignty over
the high seas was beyond the reach of and could not be acquired
by any state whereas jurisdiction to punish wrongs and repress
piracy, was acquirable, if not indeed, an incidental or inherent power
29
of every state."
The principle of sovereign control by the coastal state over territorial waters adjacent thereto nevertheless survived its definition
through Italian authorship approximately at the opening of the" fif30
teenth century.
This resum6 of the salient postulates of International Law presents a facet of the transmuted influence of the British Navigation
Acts upon the classic judicial interpretations of the commerce clause.
These Acts were being enforced while the African slave trade
continued with unabated recognition of its legality and Great Britain
was obstinately resisting the doctrine of freedom of the seas. John
25 HARPER,

THE ENGISH NAvIGATION

LAWS,

38, 48 (New York, 1939); FIRTi

& RAft, Acs AwD OmAnwucs oF TH INTEENum, 559-562 (London, 1911).
26 Reppy, The Grotian Doctrine of Freedom of the Seas Reappraised, 19 FORDHAm: L. Rxv. 243, 256-259 (1950).
27 2 Dods. 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817).
28

See note 26, supra at 275.

29 Id. at 275-276.

30 Id. at 277, 278.
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Selden, the learned antagonist of Grotius, had published Mare
Clausum in answer to his Dutch opponent in 1635."'
The Navigation Act of 1651, passed as a commercial attack upon
the Dutch during the rule of Cromwell, produced the formula continued at the Restoration for that economic exclusiveness which
England proceeded to follow with her generally unparalleled naval
might, throughout the greater portion of the next two centuries. This
Act of 1651 prohibited the carrying trade, subject to specific exceptions, unless the merchandise was produced in the country of the same
nationality as the conveying ship. This undermined deliberately the
carrying and entrepot enterprises of Holland. 2
Virginia and Massachusetts, established by 1651 and the remaining Continental Colonies or Plantations that were to be similarly secure by approximately 1680, were founded or were to succeed in the
process of settlement, as the consequence of one or the other of the
rival forms of either the private adventure or proprietor on the one
hand or of the incorporated company on the other.3 3 Hence commercial undertakings played obviously the leading part in effecting permanent settlements in America.34 Experiences during the early years
of settlement produced an agreement upon a commercial scheme of
regulation that comprised five parts:31
"First, the colonies were to be given a monopoly of the English market; secondly, England was to have a monopoly of the colonial output; thirdly, England was to obtain, as essential to her commercial
independence, entire control of the carrying trade; fourthly, the colonies were to be reckoned outside the fiscal realm and therefore under
obligations to pay the regular customs duties; and fifthly, in order
to enforce these regulations, England was to enlarge her navy and her
mercantile marine, increasing by every means in her power the number of her ships, their tonnage, men, and equipment."
These commercial regulations of the Tudors and early Stuarts
contain in essence most of the principles embodied in the later Navigation Act." It was the administration of these acts after the Restoration and during the subsequent portion of the American colonial
31 Id. at

270.

32 HAIER, TnE ENmLISH NAVIGATION LAws, 34, 48, 49 (New York, 1939).
33 1 ANDREWS, THE COLONMA- PEIIOD 0r Am EmICAN HISTORY, 78, 255, 3441 (Cambridge, 1938).

34 Id. at 78.
35 4 ANDREWS,

1938).
36 Ibid.

THE

COLONA

PmoD or AvPmCAw

HISTORY, 21

(Cambridge,
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era, with particular regard to the fisheries, the slave trade and the
attempt of parliament to regulate manufacture and to achieve a uniform currency both in the West Indian and in the Continental Colonies, that are mirrored in the critical early opinions which were rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States or by its Justices
on Circuit in construing the grant to the Federal government in the
Constitution of her power to regulate commerce.
In the eighteenth century, England in the interests of commercial policy had endeavored to transform the private colonies into
royal dependencies, to bring them all into a uniform system of administration; to put into operation the acts of trade and navigation;
and profit to herself
and to utilize the colonies as a source of trade
7
mercantilism.3
of
principles
the
to
according
According to these principles, England in the years immediately
following the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, sought to preserve a favorable balance of trade in its dealings with former nations. The fisheries, centered upon the waters of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia,
were looked upon as nurseries of seamen, encouragers of navigation,
and among the chief supports of the nation, because they helped to
increase England's favorable balance of trade with Portugal and the
Straits through barter for wines, oil, oranges and the like.8 8 After
1715, this system of mercantilism was accompanied by the influx
into the colonies of a yearly quota of Negroes of more than 27,000
from the western coast of Africa. Their presence was essential for
the cultivation of sugar cane, tobacco and the rice fields in the tropical colonies where white labor proved inadequate to meet the hard
conditions of plantation life. 9
During the eighteenth century mercantilism, protection of British enterprise upon and across the high seas was of paramount interest.
"No phase of the whole situation fills a larger place in the executive records or parliamentary annals of the period or were regulated
than the Newfoundland fishwith more difficulty or less satisfaction
' 40
ery and the African slave trade.
37 1 A.DRIws, THE CoaoNAi

bridge, 1938).

38 4 ANDREws,

bridge, 1938).
89 Id. at 346.
40

Ibid.

PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY,

Preface XIII (Cam-

Tr. COLONIAl. PERIOD OF AmRCAN HISTORY, 344, 345 (Cam-
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The operation of the mercantile system within the North American Colonies as distinguished from these last named external incidences, included the regulation of the production, manufacture and
inter-colonial transportation of wool; and similar provisions were en4
acted for hats.

1

The chief source of friction and irritation from economic supervision over North America by Parliament arose, however, from the
statutes regulating the value of foreign coin and limiting the issue of
paper money; and the absence of a stable and unified currency in the
Continental and insular dependencies remained to the end of the
42
Colonial Era an unsolved problem of imperial administration.
Up to 1764, however, the indications are that a surprisingly
widespread general satisfaction existed in Continental America with
the Navigation Act as a system of imperial protection. 43 At this juncture, the acquisition by Great Britain of a world-wide imperial domain necessitated the reorganization of her system of colonial administration. This reorganization induced resort to the Navigation Acts
for revenue purposes. 44 That policy which inaugurated the movement towards American independence led to one futile attempt by
the British government to control intercolonial transportation by
land,45 though the regulation of intercolonial commerce had precedents to support it in the provisions of the statute, previously cited,
that had interdicted the intercolonial transportation of raw wool and
hats.40
On the eve of the American Revolution, Alexander Hamilton
conceded the right of Great Britain to regulate the trade of the Em47
pire so long as it was in no way connected with a revenue.
The acquiescence of Continental America in this breadth of imperial regulation, apart from exactions of revenue, is of equal rele41 Dicxmsox, THE NAVIGATIOx AcTS AND THE AmHmcAN REVOUTON, 19 (Philadelphia, 1951); 10 & 11 Wm. & Mary III, c. 10, § 19 (1700); 5 Geo. II, c. 22,

§§ 1, 7, 8, 10 (1731-2).
42 DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION
(Philadelphia, 1951).
43 Id. Introduction XIII.
44 Id. at 121 et seq.
45 Id. at 251-254.
46 See note 41 supra.

AcTs AND THE AmEcAN

REVOLUTION,

21-22

47 Id. at 127; ALEXANDER HAMrILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED, OR A MORE IMPARTIAL AND COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE DISPUTE AS AN ANSWER TO THE LETTER FROM
A. W. FARMER, ENTITLED A VEw oF THE CONTROVERSY, ETc. 48, 49 (New York,

1775).
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vancy in understanding the later correlative grants to the United
States in the Constitution of the commerce power48 and of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The Navigation Acts were in
large measure enforced during the period of American colonialism
through the Vice Admiralty Courts. The result was that their jurisdiction in America, in contrast to that in England, had an abiding
virility and security.5"
If the absence of a Federal Union had been prolonged after
Independence, thirteen sovereign states would have been free under
the inherited principles of International Law and of mercantilist
practice to enforce a navigation system of their own with a mature system of Admiralty Jurisprudence available to lend sanction to the policy of economic separatism. The certainty of ensuing chaos was therefore sufficiently palpable for Alexander Hamilton to dispose of any
potential opposition to the grant of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts under the Constitution of the United States
in the following two sentences:51
"The most bigoted idolizers of state authority, have not thus far
shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of
maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations,
and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within
the considerations relative to the public peace."
III. THE COMMERCE POWER AND FREEDOM OF THE
SEAS
As in the instance of the admiralty grant, the unified commercial
power vested in the United States through the medium of the commerce power 52 is a direct outgrowth of the international society into
which this nation was born. The inability of the United States to
obtain a commercial treaty from Great Britain in 1783 when she recognized our Independence is of cardinal importance in comprehending the reason for and purport of the presence of the commerce and
naval powers in the Constitution.52 A cognate clause conferred the
48 Art. I, §
49 Art. III,

8(3).
§ 2.

50 4 ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 359 (Cambridge,
1938).

51 Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause ins
the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1214 (1953-54), quoting THE FEDERALST,
No. 80 at 590, 591 (J. C. Hamilton Ed. 1864).
52 U. S. CONST. art. I § 8(3); Id. at (13).
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authority upon Congress to define and punish piracies."3 The enumeration of these powers in the Constitution thereafter enabled the
newly formed American government to maintain the doctrine of freedom of the seas.54 The first concern, however, in the formulation of
the commerce clauses, to the extent that foreign relations were concerned, was to break down the British navigation system from which
the United States were excluded by their political independence.
Hamilton explains in detail the necessity for Congress to wield the
unified commerce power together with the power to establish a navy
as a medium for wringing commercial concessions from foreign nations, and from Great Britain in particular: 5
"The importance of the union, in a commercial light, is one of
those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference
of opinion, and which has in fact commanded the most general assent
of men, who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies
as well to our intercourse with foreign countries, as with each other.
"There are appearances to authorize a supposition, that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of
America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too
great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of their
navigation, and the foundation of their naval strength.
"* * * Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of
ministers. If we continue united, we may, in a variety of ways, counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity. By prohibitory regulations, extending at the same time throughout the states, we may
oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges
of our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those
who are able to appreciate the importance, to any manufacturing nation, of the markets of three millions of people, increasing in rapid
progression; for the most part, exclusively addicted to agriculture,
and likely from local circumstances to remain in this disposition; and
the immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of
such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and
an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from
America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we
53 U. S. CoNsT. art. I § 8(10): "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations." See Madison,
THE FEDnERAusT, No. 80 (J. C. Hamilton Ed. 1864); MooRE, AwmmcAN DIPLoMAcY,
63-65 (New York & London, 1905).
54 Id. at 63 et seq.
5 TE FaFnRALIST, No. 11, entitled "The Utility of the Union in Respect to Corntnerce and a Navy." (J. C. Hamilton Ed. 1864).
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had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain
(with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our
ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her
politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and
extensive kind in the dominions of that kingdom?
"* * * A mature consideration of the objects, suggested by these
questions, will justify a belief, that the real disadvantages to Great
Britain, from such a state of things, conspiring with the prepossessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the American trade,
and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce
a relaxation in her present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands and elsewhere, from
which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a
point gained from the British government, and which could not be
expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our
markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves
altogether supplanted in our trade.
"A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations towards us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment
of a federal navy. There can be no doubt, that the continuance of
the union, under an efficient government, would put it in our power,
at a period not very distant, to create a navy, which, if it could not
vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of
respectable weight, if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be more particularly the case, in relation to
operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient
to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which, interests of
the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a very commanding one. And if to this consideration we add
that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived, that a situation so favorable, would enable us to bargain
with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be
set, not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a
steady adherence to the union, we may hope, ere long, to become the
arbiter of Europe in America; and to be able to incline the balance
of European competitions in this part of the world, as our interest
may dictate.
"* * * There are rights of great moment to the trade of America, which are rights of the union: I allude to the fisheries, to the
navigation of the lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the confederacy would give room for delicate questions, concerning the future existence of these rights; which the interest of
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more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain, with regard to the Mississippi, needs
no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries; and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation.
They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided
mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed, in this
valuable branch of traffic; and by which we are able to undersell
those nations in their own markets. What more natural, than that
they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous
competitors?
"This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial
benefit. All the navigating states may in different degrees advantageously participate in it; and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capacity, would not be unlikely to do it. As a
nursery of seamen, it now is, or, when time shall have more clearly
assimilated the principles of navigation in the several states, will become an universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must
be indispensable."
Hamilton was describing the Navigation Acts in the role that
the modern historians have rediscovered them. His recognition of the
unified purpose of navigation and the fisheries for the propagation of
seamen confirms this conclusion.5"
During the Napoleonic Wars which broke out less than five years
after the inauguration of Washington, the State Department in opposition to Great Britain relied upon Grotius as the source for the principles to sustain the Americans' rights as neutrals to trade with the
warring nations. 57 As mercantilist practices still prevailed, the British
"Rule of 1756" prohibited during war a trade from a colony to its
mother country that had been closed to other countries in time of
peace."8 As a corollary, the continuity of a voyage from Havana to
Barcelona was not broken by the landing in the United States and
the payment of duties which were later refunded under the law governing re-exports.5 9 The British decisions sustained this construction.60 Impressment of American sailors by British captains was a
56 Johnson,

J.,

concurring in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 230 (U. S. 1824);

MAHAN, SEA PowER IN ITs RELATIONS TO THE WAR O1 1812, c. I, 1-41 (Boston, 1905).
57 BRANT, JAMES MADISON, SECRETARY OF STATE (1801-1809)
296 (Indianapolis,

1941-50).
58 Id. at 294.
59 Ibid.
60 The Aurora, 4 C. Rob. 218, 165 Eng. Rep. 591 (1802); The Essex, cited in
The Maria, 5 C. Rob. 365, 368, 165 Eng. Rep. 806, 808 (1805).
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further source of controversy and was given the chief place by President Madison in his message of June 1, 1812 recommending war."
After the United States had demonstrated her strength at sea,
Great Britain became amenable to the policy of reciprocity towards
bringing about the abolition of the Navigation Laws, a policy which
the United States had inaugurated in the treaty of commerce with
France in 1778.62 The steps by which this first breach in the Navigation System was made fulfilled Hamilton's prediction :03
"Before the formation of the Constitution, the several States
were driven for purposes of retaliation to impose discriminating duties on foreign vessels and their cargoes. The system was continued
by the government of the United States, for the same reason. By an
act of March 3, 1815, 64 however, Congress offered to abolish all discriminating duties, both of tonnage and of impost, on foreign vessels
laden with the produce or manufactures of their own country, on
condition of the concession of a reciprocal privilege to American vessels. By 'discriminating duties' are meant all duties in excess of what
would be charged, in the particular country, one of its own vessels
and the cargo imported in it. This principle first found conventional
expression in the treaty of commerce and navigation with Great Britain of July 3, 1815; 65 but its operation was therein confined, on the
part of that power, to the British territories in Europe."
The dispatch of two squadrons under Bainbridge and Decatur
to Algiers in the spring of 1815 pursuant to Act of Congress," likewise furthered freedom of the seas by ending piracy in the Mediterranean.

67

This is the International Law background for the decision rendered in 1823 by Mr. Justice Johnson in Elkinson v. Deliesseline.08
The sheriff arrested a free Negro who was a seaman on a British vessel in Charleston Harbor in pursuance of the statute of South Carolina."9 This statute provided for the imprisonment of free Negro sea61 MooRE, AwmCAN DIP'.OmAci, 72-74 (New York & London, 1905).
62 Id. at 106, 107.
63 Id. at 118.
64 3 STAT. 224.
65 1 MALLOY, TREIES, CONvENTIONS, INTERNATONAL Acrs, PROTOCOLS AND AOREEMENTS BETWEEN" THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS 1776-1909, 624 (Wash.,
D. C., 1910).
66 Act of March 3, 1815, 3 STAT. 230.
67 MOORE, A.ixucAN DLoM Ac y 118 (New York & London, 1905).
68 8 Fed. Cas. 493, No. 4,366; 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 56 (C. C. D. So. Car. 1823).
69 Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina
passed in December 1820, 22-24 (Columbia, 1821).
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men and for their sale into slavery in the event that the master of
the vessel failed to obtain their release by paying the costs of their
detention. Upon writs made returnable by counsel for the discharge
of the prisoner, Mr. Justice Johnson held the state enactment unconstitutional upon two grounds: first, that the commerce clause had
placed the entire jurisdiction over navigation in the United States as
a part of her commercial regulations; 07 and secondly, that the state
act violated the treaty of 1815 with Great Britain. After stating that
the case did not rest with the conclusion of the first ground, the
71

Justice continued :
"... In order to sustain this law, the state must also possess a pow-

er paramount to the treaty-making power of the United States, expressly declared to be a part of the supreme legislative power of the land;
for, seizure of this man, on board a British ship, is an express violation of the commercial convention with Great Britain, of 1815. Our
commerce with that nation does not depend upon the mere negative
sanction of not being prohibited. A reciprocal liberty of commerce
is expressly stipulated for, and conceded by, that treaty; to this the
right of navigating their ships in their own way, and particularly
by their own subjects, is necessarily incident. If policy requires any
restriction of this right, with regard to a particular class of subjects
of either contracting party, it must be introduced by treaty. The opposite party cannot introduce it by any legislative act of his own.
Such a law is not to be passed even by the general government, without furnishing a just cause of war."
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson in Gibbons v.
Ogden72 is undoubtedly the immediate outgrowth of Elkinson v. Deliesseline73 owing largely to the heated controversy that this decision
had engendered the year before in South Carolina.7" The reaction
of the Justice is palpably evinced by his declaration, virtually at
the outset of his concurrence in Gibbons v. Ogden75 that the Constitution was adopted "for the protection of the humblest individual."
Thereafter he refers to the 17th and 18th century mercantilist
restrictions imposed by Great Britain upon the colonies; to their own
selfish exercise of these regulations upon their attainment of independence; and to the resulting commercial conflicts between them as
70 8 Fed. Cas. at 495; 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. at 65.
71 Ibid.; 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. at 65-66.

72 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222-239, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
73 8 Fed. Cas. 493, No. 4,366; 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 56 (C. C. D. So. Car. 1823).

74 MORGAN, WILLIAM JOHNSON, 190 et seq. (Columbia, S. C., 1954).
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the immediate cause for forming the Constitutional Convention."
With regard to these separate regulations, he concludes : 7
"The history of the time, will, therefore, sustain the opinion, that the
grant of power over commerce, if intended to be commensurate with
the evils existing, and the purpose of remedying those evils, could be
only commensurate with the power of the States over the subject."
In respect to the actual words of Article I, Section 8 (3), Justice
Johnson stressed the "power to regulate commerce" as meaning the
grant of "power to regulate commerce which previously existed in
the States." 78 He follows immediately with a query of his own: "But
what was that power?" 7 9 His answer was that the definition and limits of that power were to be sought among the features of international law; that the power must be exclusive; that it could reside
in but one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carried with
it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State to act upon.80
That the genuinely dramatic situation presented so recently to
the Justice in South Carolina was constantly on his mind appears
emphatically from subsequent and pertinent passages in his opinion: 8
"Power to regulate foreign commerce, is given in the same words, and
in the same breath, as it were, with that over the commerce of the
States and with the Indian tribes. But the power to regulate foreign
commerce is necessarily exclusive. * * * Whatever regulations foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the
general government would be held responsible for them; . * ."
(Italics in the original.)
With specific reference to the facts in Gibbons v. Ogden, he asserted :82
"The present is an instance of the assertion of that kind, as
incidental to a municipal power; that of superintending the internal
concerns of a State, and particularly of extending protection and
patronage, in the shape of a monopoly, to genius and enterprise.
"The grant to Livingston and Fulton, interferes with the freedom of intercourse among the States; and on this principle its constitutionality is contested.
76 Id. at 224.
77 Id. at 225-226.
78 Id. at 227.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Id.at 228, 229.
82 Id. at 229.
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"When speaking of the power of Congress over navigation, I do
not regard it as a power incidental to that of regulating commerce.
I consider it as the thing itself; inseparable from it as vital motion
is from vital existence."
Ship building, the carrying trade, and propagation of seamen
were vital portions of the commerce power,8 3 the Justice reasoned;
and in the same vein, classified the right of Congress over navigation
and the transportation of men and their goods, "not only as incidental to, but actually of the essence of, the power to regulate comM 4
merce."
On like grounds of International Law, the decision of the Court
delivered by the Chief Justice stands for the identical principle that
navigation and transportation are essential means for carrying on intercourse for purposes of trade; and it is this intercourse which is
under the exclusive power of Congress; but the deliberate choice
by Chief Justice Marshall of the ostensible statutory ground in the
Coasting Act85 as the basis for decision obscured in later generations
the actual point determined. In the following year, Mr. Justice Washington nevertheless stated in Corfield v. Coryell 8 the true holding of
7
the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden:
"Commerce with foreign nations, and among several states, can mean
nothing more than intercourse with those nations, and among those
states, for purposes of trade, be the object of the trade what it may;
and this intercourse must include all the means by which it can be
carried on, whether by the free navigation of the waters of the several states, or by a passage over land through the states, where such
passage becomes necessary to the commercial intercourse between the
states. It is this intercourse which Congress is invested with the
power of regulating, and with which no state has a right to interfere."
In this case, New Jersey had by statute reserved the right to
work her oyster beds to residents. The constitutionality of this
act of June 9, 1820 was upheld upon the authority of Grotius:88
83 Id. at 230.
84 Id. at 231.
85 1 STAT. 305 (1793).

80 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 550, No. 3,230 (C. C. E. D. ]?a. 1825).
87 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). In The Nymph, 18 Fed. Cas.
506, No. 10,388, which involved a license for the fisheries, Story, J., gave an extremely wide interpretation to "trade" as used in section 32 of the Coasting Act
(1 STAT. 305) that was applied in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed.
23 (1824). See quotation thereof in United States v. Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S.
485, 490, 70 S. Ct. 711, 715, 94 L. Ed. 1007 (1949).
88 Supra note 86 at 552.
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" 'The sovereign,' says Grotius (book 2, C. 2, § 5), 'who has dominion over the land, or waters, in which the fish are, may prohibit
foreigners (by which expression we understand him to mean others
than subjects or citizens of the state) from taking them.'"
Judges of the same generation had no difficulty in grasping the
point that local interference by state statute with her internal commerce regulated by Act of Congress was invalid under the majority
0
opinion of Gibbons v. Ogden 0 (Steam-Boat Company v. Livingstone;9
2
1
U. S. v. Jackson9); when it did "affect other States.
IV. CONCLUSION
THE failure to understand the influence of the British Navigations Acts upon the adjudications of the commerce power by the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall may seriously be reflected in the original judicial construction of section 1 of the 14th
Amendment0 8 and also throughout the post-Civil War decisions upon
the interstate commerce clause.
As to the former, if the doctrines of Grotius, as Mr. Justice
Washington apparently interprets them, confine the exclusive power
of the several states over trade and commerce literally to the subjectmatter of the proprietary interests of each of these sovereigns, the
right to engage in the ordinary avocations of life would accordingly be guaranteed by the complementary principle to the citizens
of the United States under the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution. 4 In that event, the issue might again be raised if the
same clause in the 14th Amendment was not misread in sustaining
the legislative grant by Louisiana of the monopoly in the SlaughterHouse Cases 5
As to the post-Civil War adjudications upon the interstate commerce clause, the persistence of opinion that in order to invoke it
water transportation was essential, 96 reveals a fortiori error in under89 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186 et seq., 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
90 3 Cow. 713 (N. Y. 1825).
91 26 Fed. Cas. 559, No. 15,458 (S. D. N. Y. 1841), per Betto, D. J.
92 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 194, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
93 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
94 Article IV, section 2. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States."
95 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
96 Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456 (U. S. 1875).
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standing Chief Justice Marshall. 7 Mr. Justice Brewer omitted to
acknowledge his own earlier fallacy and that of the Court in this
respect,"8 when he invented the fiction of maintaining the even flow
of interstate commerce to justify presidential action in suppressing
within Illinois alone the national strike called by the American Railway Union. 9
This tacit change of view suggests the presence of an equitable
gloss derived from the nuisance jurisdiction' 00 to account for the judicial evolution of the commerce power in regard to overland transportation from the 6-3 division of the Court in the Wabash decision, 1 1 to the 7-2 vote in the Shreveport Cases.' In the first, an
intrastate railroad rate which affected interstate rates was held
invalid pro tanto; in the second, annulment was ordered of a similar
rate for intrastate shipments which gave the latter a preference
over interstate competition. And the inescapable fact of transportation in Shreveport helped no doubt to postpone throughout another
generation the definitive acceptance by the Supreme Court of practical judgment drawn from the course of business as the test for
interstate commerce, 03 despite the absence of passage of the subjectmatter across state lines. 0 4
The query abides whether the putative equitable gloss suggested
above as the solution for this outcome is a reality and has unconsciously been assimilated with one or more derivatives from the Civil
Law that may have been required to put the commerce power into
appropriate operation; particularly, as that might not have been in05
digenous to the common law.'
The intrusion of an evanescent domestic feature that sacrificed
for a period the normal authority of that power is certain. In Groves
97 Pullman's Palace Car v. Twombly, 29 Fed. 658, 666 (C. C. S. D. Iowa, 1887);
per Brewer, S. J.
98 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 196, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
99 Supra note 96.
100 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
101 Rounds, Injunctions Against Liquor Nuisances, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 521 (1896);
Moody, J., dissenting in the (First) Employers? Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 525,
28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297, 320 (1907).
102 Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886).
103 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398, 25 S. Ct. 276, 286, 49-50

L. Ed. 518, 525 (1904).

104 Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 68 S. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed.

1328 (1948).
105 Johnson, J., concurring in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 227 (1824).

(1824).
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v. Slaughter,0 0 the dictum of Chief Justice Taney denied the competence of Congress to forbid the slave trade by virtue of the commerce power. At International Law, such a prohibition was recog10 7
nized as an attribute of sovereignty.
The orthodox antithesis between Marshall and Taney may therefore contain a perfect gauge for ascertaining the result of their opposing attitudes toward the extension of the interstate commerce
power. In Osborn v. The Bank,0 8 the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall had made available the jurisdiction of the United States
Circuit Courts to suit by the branches of the Second Bank of the
United States. The Supreme Court had thereby emphasized its critical entry upon the invariably sensitive commercial area of currency
regulation. °9 It was Taney as Secretary of the Treasury, who destroyed the Bank by the removal of the deposits prior to the expiration of its charter. The coincidence between Shreveport, argued and
decided at the October Term, 1913, and the establishment of the
Federal Reserve System" vindicates Taney's possession of the qualities of statesmanship demanded by Constitutional Law."' As his
opinions as Chief Justice portray, he devined the compulsive force
of public opinion towards local rule which would outlast the century, and he added new flexibility to the commerce power to serve
that purpose." 2
From this standpoint, the commerce power provides a pattern
for national interests whenever the universal possession of atomic
weapons leads to the firm establishment of international supervision
over historic governments. More concretely, the reanalysis of the ebb
and flow of national authority in the United States under the commerce power from the accession of Chief Justice Taney until the present day should yield an objective approach to the adjudications that
must ensue from jet propulsion, synthetic moons, probably from
flights to the moon and indubitably from the unforeseeable products
of atomic energy.
106 15 Pet. 449, 508-510 (U. S. 1841).
Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817).
108 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), Johnson, J., dissenting. Id. at 872-874.
109 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819); see
also, p.
supra; Thayer, Legal Tender, in Legal Essays, 60, 84, 1 HARV. L. Rv.
73, 92 (1887) quoting LomE, Woaxs or HAw'moN, iii, 213.
110 Act of December 23, 1913, c. 6, 38 STAT. 251.
111 Eulogy of Chief justice Taft upon Chief justice White, 257 U. S. XXIV,
107

XXV.
112

License Cases, 5 How. 504, 579 (U. S. 1897).

